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a b s t r a c t
One of the main approaches we have for studying the progressive divergence of under-
standings around a risk issue is that of social risk amplification. This article describes a case
study of a particular environmental contaminant, a chemical flame retardant that could be
interpreted as having produced a risk amplifying process. It describes in particular how a
group of industrial organizations acted collectively to reduce emissions of this contaminant,
in an apparent attempt to avert regulation and boycotts—that is, to intercept the social
amplification process and avoid its secondary effects. The aim of the study was to inves-
tigate the constitutive qualities of this collective action: the qualities that defined it and
made it effective in the eyes of those involved. These include institutionalisation and
independence, the ability to confer individual as well as collective benefit, the capacity
to attract (rather than avoid) criticism, and the ‘branding’ that helps communicate what
otherwise appear to be a set of unconnected, local actions. Although the risk amplification
framework has been criticised for implying that there is some externally given risk level that
is subsequently amplified, it does appear to capture the mentality of actors involved in
issues of this kind. They talk and act as though they believe they are participants in a risk
amplification process.
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1.1. A problem of risk ‘amplification’
This article is a case study of a flame retardant and
environmental contaminant, decabromodiphenyl ether
(Deca-BDE) that has been the object of significant controversy,
advocacy group activity, lobbying and regulation. An extended
risk assessment in Europe (ECB, 2002, 2004) found little
positive evidence of harm, but admitted to being unable to
determine on a scientific basis whether the substance posed a
risk or not. This has left the ground open for significant
divergence between the understandings of different groups.
Such divergence is, of course, a principal theme in risk studies.* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1524 594447.
E-mail address: j.s.busby@lancaster.ac.uk (J.S. Busby).
1462-9011/$ – see front matter # 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2008.12.001It has been a major impetus to research on risk perception in
particular, and an important conclusion from this has been
that lay perception can in some sense be richer than expert
analysis (Slovic, 1987). Cultural theories have added to this an
understanding that it is cultures which often select risks for
particular attention, andwhich determine the logics we use to
react to those risks (Douglas, 1986; Douglas and Wildavsky,
1982; Schwarz and Thompson, 1990). The ‘social amplification
of risk framework’, or SARF (Kasperson et al., 1988), has then
provided us with a synthesis of these themes, together with
the role of strategic social actors such as themedia. It has also
provided insights into how secondary or ‘ripple’ effects are
produced when social processes get to work on an issue: the
consequences we experience are not just those linked to the.
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responses, such as product boycotts, regulation, loss of
institutional confidence and so on. Work in the general
context of SARF has inter alia helped us understand the arenas
in which various social groups operate around a risk issue (for
example Renn, 1992), the production and influence of
stigmatisation (Kasperson et al., 2005), and the influence of
organizational ‘recreancy’ on the public evaluation of an issue
(Freudenberg, 2003).
The case of Deca-BDE, and chemical flame retardantsmore
generally, also illustrates Freudenberg’s (1993) thesis about the
threatening quality of the division of labour. The risk that
flame retardants are meant to mitigate is at least sometimes
within the influence of the risk bearer. People who choose to
smoke or light candles at home put themselves at risk of
domestic fire, for instance. But the risk of toxicity from
exposure to flame retardant chemicals, whatever it ‘really’ is,
mostly lies beyond the risk bearer’s agency. This creates a
division of labour between risk bearers and the various
organizations they expect to manage this toxicity risk—the
producers of the flame retardants, the formulators who mix
these chemicals with others, the textile coaters who apply
them to textiles, the furniture manufacturers, retailers,
regulators, their supporting scientific laboratories and so on.
It might appear to risk bearers that they exchange a risk partly
within their control for a risk that causes them to depend on a
whole array of organizations, of which nearly all are unknown
to them. This dependence may well amplify anxieties in its
own right, in away that appears independent ofwhat emerges
from formal processes of risk assessment.
The communications theory metaphor used in SARF has
been criticised on various grounds: Bakir’s (2005) article and
Rosa’s (2003) analysis provide a summary of what have been
seen as its shortcomings. Perhaps the most significant is the
way in which – from the beginning – the framework has been
taken to imply that there is some externally given or accurate
understanding of risk that is socially amplified or socially
attenuated (Rayner, 1988). It is easy to see the problem of such
an implication in the Deca-BDE case. Despite the extensive
scientific literature on the compound, the question of what
kind of risk we ‘really’ experience in using Deca, and what is
the ‘real’ significance of finding it in various environmental
compartments, is too contested to think there is a correct or
true pattern of risk. But there is certainly a divergence or
disjuncture in understandings of the kind that SARF is about,
and these do seem to be the product of social processes rather
than randomdifferences of belief. There is also, as in SARF, the
production of important secondary consequences beyond
direct physical harm. Whether or not the divergence seen in
this case could really be said to be an ‘amplification’ of some
less significant discrepancy or problem, we do see in a social
response that has somehow become enlarged or expanded
beyond what some of the actors (particularly industrial
organizations) consider necessary and appropriate.
Given the roots of SARF in communication theory, themost
obvious implication for risk managers is to deal with
amplification by improving the practice of risk communica-
tion. Risk communication in the context of the chemical
industry has particularly been linked with acute releases of
toxins to communities local to manufacturing sites (forexample Chess, 2001). But another heuristic that can be read
from SARF is to look for ways of interrupting or impeding the
processes that bring about SARF’s ‘ripple’ or secondary effects.
It is these secondary effects, like product boycotts or
restrictive regulations, that most obviously express what is
consequential about heightened risk perceptions. In the case
of Deca-BDE the debate in recent years has been strongly
oriented around getting regulators to ban the substance and
getting users to find substitutes. So it is natural to look at an
industry’s attempt at averting regulation as an attempt to
interrupt a risk amplification process.
Another of the criticisms that has been made of SARF is
that it is not a predictive theory (Rayner, 1988). It does not, for
instance, predict whether the social reaction to scientific
findings about Deca will ultimately lead to regulatory action.
But it can still be seen as a model of the mentality that actors
adopt when dealing with a risk issue. We may not be able to
say objectively whether there is amplification of a true risk
level, but from a particular actor’s standpoint it is quite likely
there is at least some best estimate of a true level, and that
there are social phenomena that distort this estimate, and that
such distortions have important consequences. So, although
SARF may not tell us what is going on in the social world at
large, it can serve as a representation of a certain mentality.
This notion of risk amplification as amentality, rather than an
objective description of events, also fits with the idea that
organizations are not simply stimulated into risk managing
actions by their environment but by their perception of the
environment (Chess, 2001). Chemical manufacturers with an
amplificatorymodel of a risk issue will perceive the possibility
of risk understandings elsewhere becoming amplified and
potentially leading to boycotts and regulation in a way that is
somehow unjustified or in need of counteraction. If we go
along with the idea of SARF as amodel of actors’ mentalities it
cannot then be predictive, since it might lead those actors to
behave in such a way as to avoid the outcomes that themodel
might suggest to them. Yet it can still serve as an organizing
principle, illuminating the way in which different actors
explain to themselves how anxieties can become inflated, and
how this may threaten their interests.
The notion of risk amplification as an actor’s way of
evaluating the responses of other actors also fits in with the
observation that, in cases like that of Deca, there are usually
some actors who seem to see the response as being distinctly
attenuated rather than amplified. To them the general
reaction and the regulatory response looks underplayed and
inadequate given the potential seriousness of the risks they
see in this substance and its emergence as an environmental
contaminant. Their mentality appears to be that negative
amplification of a risk has occurred and that this too has
secondary effects. Thus, whether the amplification is positive
or negative, the basic notion of social amplification provides a
way of explaining to one actor how another’s responses can
seem so inappropriate.
1.2. A problem of possible toxicity
The polybrominated diphenyl ethers (or PBDEs) were brought
into production to serve an essentially protective function as
chemical flame retardants, particularly in the UK where it
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the risk of fire in homes, as well as flammability standards
specific to large, institutional product users such as the UK
National Health Service. But these compounds then became a
risk issue in their own right. Their introduction followed a
recent history of other brominated flame retardants that had
become embroiled in controversy (for example ‘PBBs’ and
‘TRIS’), and they had appeared in environmental chemists’
analyses when they were looking for substances already
known to be toxic, such as PCBs, in various environmental
compartments. PBDEs became a focus for advocacy groups,
such as theWWF,when theywere found to be accumulating in
marine organisms. They persisted in the environment and
were suspected of being bioaccumulative and toxic. A pivotal
study appeared to show their concentration in Swedish breast
milk increasing exponentially over time (Meironyte et al.,
1999), the less-brominated members of the PBDE group were
banned in some countries, and they were withdrawn
voluntarily from production in others. This left a heavier
compound, known as decabromodiphenyl ether, or simply
‘Deca’, in production.
Eventually this too came under suspicion, and was the
subject of a substantial risk assessment (ECB, 2002, 2004) in
Europe. Nonetheless, as described in more detail in a later
section, this risk assessment seems to have done little to settle
the issue. It was unable to find significant positive evidence of
risk to human health, yet at the same time concluded that it
was ‘not possible to say whether or not on a scientific basis
there is a current or future risk to the environment’ (ECB, 2004).
The European member states agreed to a 10-year programme
of continued monitoring and further investigation to reduce
the ‘unresolved uncertainties’.
Much of the industry that uses Deca believed it had little
alternative but to carry on using it, on the basis that
alternatives were less effective and more expensive, and
even less was known about their health effects. As the EU risk
assessment neared completion there had been considerable
concern in the industry that Deca would be regulated, would
come under marketing restrictions and might even suffer a
complete ban. Even if restrictions had been tolerable they
might have reinforced the belief that Deca was dangerous in
some official sense. There had also been recognition that, for
all the uncertainty, it had been discharged to the environment
in large quantities overmany years. And both advocacy groups
and some governments, notably those in Nordic countries,
had continued to lobby against it. The objects of their lobbying
included large retailers of products containing Deca. The
industry’s response was a voluntary programme of emissions
control, and it is this programme that is the subject of our case
study.
The purpose of the study was to find out what is
constitutive of this kind of emissions control programme:
what qualities appear to have defined it in the eyes of those
involved, to have been necessary for its gestation, and to have
contributed to its capacity to manage the threat to the
production and use of Deca—that is, to act as an ‘interruptor’
to a risk amplification process. Our approach has been to
analyse how actors talk and write about the programme, both
in interviews and official publications, in order to draw out
these constitutive elements. This should help contribute toour general understanding of why actors caught up in a large-
scale risk issue act theyway they do—in response both to their
representations of the underlying, physical phenomena and
their representations of other actors.
2. Method
A case study method was used (for example Yin, 2003; Stake,
1995; Eisenhardt, 1989), largely because of the inter-connect-
edness of phenomenon and context. No two cases of what
might be called ‘risk amplification’ are likely to be very similar
when the nature of this amplification seems to be so
dependent on chance events and historical circumstances.
Case study methods are also highly suited to explaining
organizational activity through actors’ subjective viewpoints
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). It is these viewpoints that are
central when using the idea of risk amplification as a way of
characterising people’s mentalities, rather than as an objec-
tive description of a social process. This particular case study
was an ‘instrumental’ one (Stake, 1995), concentrating on the
development of a single programme rather than comparing
several programmes of a similar kind. As a result, care is
needed in generalizing on the findings, but it provides the
opportunity for a relatively deep analysis of a situation that
has a widespread importance in themanagement of chemical
contamination.
The data consisted of a set of 15 interviews, of which two
were collective (involving three people) and the remainder
individual, together with materials given or mentioned to us
by the interviewees, including codes of practice, seminar
presentations and reports, and briefings. Four of the inter-
views were with brominated chemical producers or their
representatives, two with formulating companies, three with
product manufacturers or their representatives, two with
retail companies, three with advocacy group representatives
and onewith a scientist whosework on Deca had been funded
by both industry and advocacy groups. The interviews were
unstructured, with a broad agenda that covered the subject of
the emissions control programme, how it originated, how it
has worked, and what its outcomes have been. At least two
researchers were involved in each interview, and the data
consisted of the notes they took and audio recordings.
Although the theoretical background to the study is
provided by work on social risk amplification, the analysis of
the data was inductive and grounded, drawing on the spirit
although not the procedure of some of the mainstream
approaches developed for qualitative analysis (for example
Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Schatzman and Strauss, 1973;
Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The data was first inspected for
references to the emissions control programme in question,
known as Voluntary Emissions Control Action Programme
(‘VECAP’), and these references were very broadly grouped
into constitutive qualities—qualities of the programme that
appeared to be central to its nature and its functioning given
the accounts of the interviewees. Our analysis was not of
what interviewees declared in some simple sense defined
the programme, but what we inferred to define the
programme from the way they chose to describe it. For
example, collectivity across an extended supply chain was a
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the way in which chemical producers, formulators, coaters
and product manufacturers found they needed to act jointly.
This was far from being a logical necessity, on face value,
because emissions were strongly concentrated at one tier in
this supply chain. But it became clear in interviewees’
accounts how a pattern of mutual interests and concerns,
and a particular distribution of expertise and power, meant
that the actors were drawn to making the programme the
object of a particular collective group.
We have divided up the account of the case into two
sections. The first section describes the case setting: the
history of the chemicals in question, and the nature and
history of the emissions programme. The section after this
presents the analysis of the constitutive elements of the
programme.
3. Case setting
3.1. Origins of the programme
Deca is added to textiles and plastics, in which it is mixed
mechanically but does not combine chemically. The focus of
our study was textiles application, as it has been particularly
difficult for most manufacturers of textile products in the UK
at least to find substitutes for Deca in textile coatings. Flame
retardants not based on Deca are seen by the industry as being
muchmore limited in their application, thereby restricting the
range of available fabrics. They have to be used in such high
quantities that they alter the fabric properties and are less
effective as a flame retardants. The UK in particular has
stringent flammability standards for furnishings, with per-
formance demands that are considered as being difficult to
meetwith chemicals other than Deca. In contrast to standards
in other European countries, for example, they impose a
durability demand that stipulates sustained flame retarding
performance even after soaking. There are several tiers in the
supply chain for treated products. Chemical manufacturers
supply Deca to ‘formulators’, who combine it with binding
substances and other coating components, such as dyes.
Formulators then supply the mixture to textile coaters. Some
of the coaters are essentially contractors to other companies,
while others manufacture textile products, such as window
blinds, in their own right. Even the commissioned coaters buy
their own coatings, however, as their expertise lies in knowing
which formulations to buy and how to apply them. Some
coated textiles are then supplied to product manufacturers –
for example manufacturers of furniture – and these supply to
retailers.
The 10-year risk assessment of Deca under the EU Existing
Substances Regulations, from 1994 to 2004, led to two
publications (ECB, 2002, 2004). It was portrayed by one
interviewee, a chemical producer, ‘as lacking in suspicion as
any chemical could be’ and ‘as close as you can get to non-
toxic’. No significant risks to human health were conclusively
identified, all safety margins were high, and all ratios of
predicted environmental concentration (PEC) to predicted no
effect concentration (PNEC) were less than one. But doubts
remained about the applicability of the risk assessmentmethodology to Deca and these, allied to concerns about
the substance’s environmental and health effects, led the
member states to agree to further investigation. Some
member states were said to have preferred a ban, on
precautionary grounds, instead of continued investigation
and the emissions control programme that we describe in this
article. Deca had been detected in the environment and in a
wide variety of fish and animals, including humans, it had
been in production for 38 years, and it was persistent—a
quality that was intrinsic to its functioning as a flame
retardant. There was also a broad range of ‘inconclusive
evidence’ (ECB, 2004) pointing to potential health hazards.
Among the concerns raised in the scientific literature are the
potential for Deca to debrominate to form more toxic
congeners, both in the environment (Stapleton et al., 2006)
and in humans (Frederiksen et al., 2009; Thuresson et al.,
2006). There is evidence that it can contribute to neuro-
developmental effects (Viberg et al., 2007), hyperthyroidism
(Betts, 2008), and adverse birth outcomes (Chao et al., 2007).
Actors in at least three tiers of the industrial supply chain
(chemical producer, coatings formulator and textile coater)
freely admitted that emissions ofDeca hadbeenunnecessarily
high in thepast, and that the significance of its persistence had
not been fully appreciated. Some have claimed that it was the
‘general low toxicity’ of brominated flame retardants that
‘may have resulted in a lack of attention being paid in the past
to emissions to the environment’ (Tange et al., 2007). But there
was a recognition in the industry that what appeared to some
to be a null risk assessment did not amount to the absence of a
risk, and certainly not to the absence of a risk issue. It appears
that it was the textile coating process that was probably the
largest source of emissionswithin the chain ofmanufacturing
processes. The main problem had been that substantial
quantities of waste coating material were washed into the
general sewer, extracted by local water company’s treatment
plants, and typically deposited as sewage sludge on the land.
Coatings consisted of Deca with antimony trioxide and acrylic
and other polymers to bind it to a fabric, and as this was very
viscous it had been impossible to get a complete yield during
the coating process. Typically coating paste was left on the
application rollers and had to be removed during changeovers.
This residual material, in many cases, was then simply
washed into the sewer. Some firms claimed to operate a ‘dry’
process in which they used waste cloths to wipe equipment
down, or had a bunded area and their own waste treatment
plant. Waste Deca was then encapsulated and removed to
controlled landfill sites by licensed contractors. But the textile
coaters tended to be very small firms so often lacked treatment
facilities. The manufacturers and formulators were much
larger, and as discharges to them represented lost profit in a
clearer way they were more strictly controlled.
It had therefore appeared to the textile coaters and the
formulators that supplied them that Deca might have been
about to be banned: ‘we were coming to the end of the Deca
risk assessment and legislation seemed likely, if not immi-
nent—if we hadn’t taken voluntary action it’s likely that the
outcome of the risk assessment would have been legislation’
(a textile coating representative). In the case of textile
coatings, more than plastics, there was no obvious substitute
for Deca. Informants described searching for replacement
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been needed in such quantities, to meet the regulatory
standards, that they would have both been very costly and
severely affected the qualities of the textiles theywere applied
to. For example (from a product manufacturer): ‘there are
alternative products but they are not as effective either
technically or cost wise, but you’ll see a lot of material coming
out of Sweden about using things like aluminum trihydrate
and magnesium hydrate. . .I have never managed to get
aluminum hydrate to work on textile materials without
destroying the appearance of the fabric. . .you have to put so
much into it that you loose a lot of other properties like
flexibility and appearance’. And (from a formulator): ‘Effective
flame retardants that are not based on Deca. . .would severely
limit the range of fabrics which would be available to the
public – Deca-antimony systems are very robust – they’ve
allowed the industry to become a fashion item’. As many of
the textile coaters were small firms they were also said (by a
chemical manufacturer) to be fearful of being included in the
scope of Integrated Pollution Prevention Control (IPPC)
legislation and ‘one-size-fits-all’ regulation that imposed
similar requirements on firms of all sizes, leading to a
disproportionate burden on the smallest.
But the issue of Deca and what would follow the risk
assessment concerned the supply chain more generally, not
just the textile coaters. One retailer talked about how it had
just come through a decade of food scares in the 1990s, how
consumers’ capacity to trust business had dissipated and how
‘everyone was twitchy that [Deca] would be another health
scare’. Moreover, the manufacture of Deca had attracted
considerable criticism from advocacy groups, who had also
contacted retailers. So all organizations in the supply chain
were in some sense threatened by the issue—and by the
activity of regulators and advocacy groups in particular. The
fact that the primary physical problem lay with some very
small companies was unfortunate. Precisely because they
were small, and several tiers removed from the chemical
manufacturers in particular, they seemed not to have realised
the significance of simply hosing persistent chemicals into the
sewer. They lacked specialised expertise in waste treatment,
and they probably saw their operations as being so small as to
have no appreciable effect on the world at large. They were
also following accepted and legal disposal practices as
specified in the safety data sheets for Deca. Thus the problem
became how to act collectively across the supply chain in
order to deal with emissions that were concentrated some-
where near the middle. This need for collective action, in
which many of the participating organizations were having to
manage a risk to themselves that originated in emissions
elsewhere, led to the formation of VECAP. This was piloted in
the UK, but then became a European programme and has now
been ‘launched’ in the USA, Canada and Japan.
The origins of the programme in the UK are probably not
accidental. The introduction of stringent flammability stan-
dards in the UK followed a spate of some particularly shocking
fires and an ‘orchestrated campaign’ to legislate against highly
flammable products. In other countries the pattern of cultural
risk selection (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Schwarz and
Thompson, 1990) has been different. One of the retail
interviewees in another country argued that risk of fireassociated with individual behaviour in the house was a
matter of individual responsibility, whereas the risk of
environmental contamination was of much greater collective
significance. The use of foam-filled, fabric-covered furniture is
also a practice found in theUK that is not replicated in all other
parts of the world. The UK was also seen as a likely source of
legislation against Deca, and the UK regulator was the
‘rapporteur’ responsible for one half of the European risk
assessment process. Thus it was in the UK that there was said
(by a formulator) to be the particular threat of simultaneously
having to meet high flammability standards while suffering
restrictions on the use of Deca. It is this that seems to have
explained the way in which VECAP originated in the UK, took
the UK as a ‘pilot’, and enjoyed a higher take up in the UK than
elsewhere.
3.2. The nature of the programme
In termsofwhat VECAPprescribes to itsmembers, the core is a
formal process that consists of six indefinitely repeated steps,
‘structured to support the principle of continuous improve-
ment’ (quoting a VECAP annual report). The first step is for a
firm, described as a ‘user’, to subscribe formally to VECAP and
embed its principles in the firm’s procedures. This is followed
by a ‘self-audit’ involving the plotting of production flows that
incorporate Deca, and what is called a ‘mass balance’
calculation that essentially means accounting for all Deca
entering the process in terms of its final destination, whether
in a product or in waste streams. Uncontrolled emissions are
determined by the residue of this calculation. This procedure
reflects the difficulty of measuring Deca in effluent directly: it
is not a constant stream and so is difficult to sample sensibly
and at a reasonable, proportionate cost, particularly given the
small size of many of the firms concerned. There is then a
‘baseline emission survey’ in which the mass balance results
are used as a basis for future monitoring. The next stage is to
develop a plan to reduce emissions, and the final stage is to put
this into practice—and evaluate the consequences to look for
further opportunities for improvement.
Inmanyrespects,VECAP reflects awider institutionalisation
of the notion of environmentalmanagement systems and their
formulation in international standards such as the ISO 14000
series—and an associated trend towards self-regulation of
environmental performance (for example Anton et al., 2003;
Stenzel, 2000). VECAP shareswith these approaches a common
motivation, namely to act as an alternative to traditional,
externalised command-and-control forms of environmental
regulation. There are also clear similarities in form: in the top-
level commitment required, the systematisation via formal
procedures, the emphasis onmonitoring, and the exhortations
towards continuous improvement. But it is specifically con-
cerned with a certain compound and prescribes specific,
technical measures: ‘ISO 14001. . .is all about the quality of
the procedures employed within an environmental manage-
mentsystem–notdirectedatanactual compoundorchemical –
whereasVECAP ismoreabout quantifying theactual releases of
a specific compound’ (a chemical producer).Nonetheless, aswe
describe later, the promotion of VECAP associates it with ISO
14001, and in subsequent sectionswe refer towhat some of the
informants in the study thought about this association.
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Practice, a Self-Audit Guidance Document, a Process Flow
Chart and a Mass Balance Sheet. The code of practice covers
tasks such as emptying of packages, where the aim is both to
minimise losses, for example coating matter left in bags, and
minimise the possibility of matter beingwashed to sewer. The
know-how incorporated in these practices looks straightfor-
ward, involving what amounts to good housekeeping, but it
applies to operations that are so prosaic that they might well
be performed heedlessly in practice (according to a chemical
producer). Within the programme there is also an indepen-
dent ‘product steward’ – an individual who is a qualified ISO
14001 auditor – to oversee the VECAP process. Presentations
given by representatives of the industry also refer to a ‘VECAP
Competence Centre (under development)’. Although it
remains a relatively small undertaking, the programme has
a distinct, independent existence beyond the mere coming
together of a handful of organizations.
The outcome looks like a considerable reduction in
reported emissions. The programme’s first annual report
claimed a 75% reduction in Deca-BDE emissions to water by
the UK textiles industry, and ‘significant progress in the other
EUMember States, on target to cover 90% of Deca-BDE usage in
the EU by June 2007’. One of the interviewees (a textile coaters’
representative), and the annual report, stated that some firms
had enjoyed a 90% reduction in emissions. Another outcome
has been that most regulators have not banned Deca, or
introduced marketing restrictions, and some have been
reported as giving highly favourable testimony on VECAP.
An EC official was quoted in the annual report as welcoming
the programme and supporting voluntary action where this
can ‘result in environmental improvement hand in hand with
economic development’. The UK environmental regulator was
reported as being ‘pleased to see chemical producers working
so effectively with their downstream users to introduce a
process to monitor and control emissions. Had VECAP been a
regulatory measure, with overall UK emission reductions of
75% in its first year, it would have been hailed as a major
success. That it was achieved as an industry voluntary
commitment means that this level of environmental protec-
tion was attained far faster and with great savings’. A Dutch
government official was similarly quoted in the second annual
report as calling the 75% reduction ‘remarkable’, and saying
that ‘Such an initiative deserves to be copied by other industry
sectors with other substances’. As we describe later, not
everyone felt the programme was so laudable.
4. Constitutive elements
In this section we describe what emerged, in our analysis, as
being the constitutive elements of VECAP that particularly
fitted the idea of VECAP as interrupting a process of risk
amplification.
4.1. Side-benefits and improvement
An important aspect of VECAP is that it leads to a general
process of improvement in the firms that subscribe to it. Its
physical consequences are not simply the reduction of Decaflows to the environment, particularly to the sewer, but a
reduction in wasted coating compound and an increased
awareness of losses in the manufacturing process. One
interviewee (a formulator) claimed to be ‘amazed’ how little
some of the companies knew of their own processes. These
companies were said to be surprised that they were ‘throwing
away material’, and prior to VECAP had (somewhat ironically)
even taken pride in recycling packaging by washing Deca out
into the drain. The emphasis in VECAP on good housekeeping,
and the idea of plottingmaterial flows, also promoted the view
that it was a way of obtaining general improvements.
Presentations on VECAP used the rhetoric of ‘continuous
improvement’ that has become integral to concepts of quality
management and, as we discuss later, the programme has
been linked to general ISO standards. Even the labelling of
those who subscribe to VECAP as ‘users’, and VECAP’s
prescribed methods as a ‘toolkit’, indicates we are meant to
see VECAP as a tool to some useful end, notmerely an exercise
in compliance.
The notion of a programme that produces side-benefits for
its subscribers as individual firms seemed important to
making VECAP attractive to potential subscribers. Some
interviewees talked about the particular difficulty of persuad-
ing firms partway down the supply chain, such as textile
coaters, of the need for controls. Once the risk assessment of
Deca had been portrayed as being favourable, it could hardly
be called a ‘dangerous’ compound, so in the textile coaters’
eyes did not seem to warrant the attention it was receiving.
The threat of regulation provided one reason to join VECAP
irrespective of how dangerous Deca was. But averting this
threat was a collective good not an individual one, so that
there could then have been a problem with free-riding—with
firms wanting to obtain the general benefit of avoiding
damaging regulation without incurring the individual cost
of subscribing to VECAP. The presence of individual side-
benefits helped reduce this danger.
In practice, these side-benefits were taken to different
degrees by different companies. Whereas some seem to have
benefited from process savings, others (for example a product
manufacturer that operated a coating process) already had a
strong efficiency programme in which waste and losses were
closely tracked. Moreover, some had effluent treatment plants
sowere not discharging to the sewer at all, only removingDeca
as encapsulated solid to controlled landfill. But – while this
meant such firms benefited less from VECAP – it also meant
the costs of complying with VECAP were limited: only a small
amount of additional surveying and monitoring.
4.2. Trust, collectivity and voluntariness
Interviewees often talked about responding to the threat of
regulation as a specifically collective action. Two for example
(a product manufacturer and textile coater’s representative)
said that at the time the risk assessment was about to
published there was a general feeling of the ‘need to form a
trade association’ of Deca users. To some extent there had
already been a distinctly collective element in the industry.
One interviewee (a formulator) for example argued that
‘everyone knew and trusted each other’. But this referred
only to the relationships between formulators and coaters. As
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source of emissions, yet the controversy surrounding Deca
involved the whole supply chain, from chemical manufac-
turers through to consumer goods retailers. So, although the
underlying issue implicated a particular group of firms, the
secondary or ‘ripple’ effects in social amplification terms
would have affected all these groups. At this level, there had
been little that was collective prior to VECAP. Some inter-
viewees (a chemical producer and formulator) referred to the
way in which chemical manufacturers had formerly had little
to do with users of their products, who were generally only
indirect customers. Another (a former chemical producer) was
critical of how chemical producers had formerly paid scant
attention to the needs of their customer chain, and another (a
retailer) talked about needing to ‘learn a common language’
and shift frombeing commercial adversaries to havingmutual
respect. There were also obstacles to collective activity in the
form of anti-trust rules. One interviewee (a chemical produ-
cer), for example, said that ‘if you look at VECAP overall, I don’t
know the exact number of people involved. . .that’s something
that we tend to keep fairly confidential, because of competi-
tion law, there are three major suppliers of brominated flame
retardants in Europe. . .but we have to be very careful in not
exchanging customer information and various other
things. . .so all our things are done through a sanitised way
of working forward’. Thus VECAP was not simply a product of
existing relationships but a creator of new ones. Reports in
praise of VECAP (Tange et al., 2007) in fact say that ‘VECAP has
succeeded in bringing downstream users, including SMEs
together with suppliers of chemical substances. . .. It has
highlighted the importance of communicating through the
supply chain. . .’.
There is a particular respect in which VECAP depends on
trust within this collective group. The VECAP process involves
an inventory of where Deca is coming from and where it is
going to, so textile coaters need to know howmuch Deca they
are acquiring from formulators. However, traditionally the
proportion of Deca in the coating formulation has been
commercially confidential. Deca is not the only component,
and (according to a formulator) it is a matter of technical
expertise how much Deca is needed to meet flammability
standards, together with binding compounds and other
substances. If a textile coater were using several of a
formulator’s products, and they were told how much Deca
they consumed in total, theywould not be able to work out the
proportion of Deca in each product. But if theywere using only
one they would. Various interviewees (two formulators and a
textile coaters’ representative); therefore referred to the need
for ‘trust’ within the VECAP programme. In fact the higher
rates of adoption of VECAP in the UK comparedwithmainland
Europe was attributed to the fact that the UK textile coating
industry was relatively small, which made it easier for the
firms to develop the trust needed to share data of this kind.
The programme was also voluntary. There was an existing
collective body in the UK textile coating industry – the Textile
Finishers Association – and they were an early locus of VECAP
activity (according to two of the formulators and a textile
coaters’ representative). But the Association’s members were
not coerced into membership of VECAP, and the stress placed
on the individual benefits for these firms reflected the need tosell VECAP to firms rather than impose it. One interviewee (a
chemical producer) argued that voluntarism naturally suited a
problem like that of Deca emissions where the risk is unclear
and disputed, and therefore where the science is sufficiently
ambiguous to stall regulatory action. Another interviewee (also
a chemical producer)voicedsome frustration thathis industrial
competitors seemed to get away violating regulatory bans—
undermining the notion that voluntarismnecessarily produces
less compliance than regulation. A retail interviewee similarly
claimed if a retailer is sufficiently embarrassed onan issuewith
the public the resulting changes it imposes on its supply chain
are much more significant than those produced by regulation.
It could be argued that this voluntarism is illusory, given
that VECAP was a self-interested response to a regulatory
threat, and perhaps in some way an inevitable one. But it was
still a choice, its design was in the hands of the industry, and
its promoters still had to convince potential members of its
worth. It may have been a self-interested action, and it may
have followed or arisen in anticipation of specific events, but
this does not make it involuntary or forced. Whether
voluntarism is objectively more effective than regulation,
and whether in fact it fits highly uncertain situations, is hard
to assess from this single case. But it was a central quality of
the programme in the eyes of its promoters: the programme
was something its members could be credited with, and
equally be held accountable for—a product of their agency
rather than some other group’s.
4.3. Criticisability and criticism
VECAP has been criticised, for how it works and what it
achieves, both from within the programme and from
outside. The outsiders’ criticism came particularly from
advocacy groups, in press reports and briefing material
(WWF, 2005), as well as interviews. VECAP was seen as a
purely defensive reaction to the threat of regulation, and
this raised the question as to whether it could be called an
‘initiative’ in any meaningful sense. It was also seen by one
advocacy group interviewee as ‘totally inadequate in that
significant exposure will result from the use of articles and
not just from Deca-BDE released from the factory’. Another
suggested that much of the reduction in emissions claimed
for VECAP may have been down to plant closures that were
independent of the programme. But even if VECAP were the
cause of emission reductions, this should not be the reason
for significant approval: ‘To stop people washing huge
quantities of brominated waste down the sink from textile
processing. . .to stop that kind of appalling practice, I don’t
see it as a great step forward by the industry’.
The insiders’ criticism was partly directed at the way some
saw theprogrammeashavingbeen initiatedby the formulators
and textile coating industry, but then taken over by the
chemical manufacturers and directed at their own ends. There
wasalsoacriticismof thebasic logic, relyingonaccounting fora
‘massbalance’ todeterminehowmuchDecawasbeing emitted
by a givenfirm. This criticismwasnot particularly hostile in the
way that the external criticism was, but it came from
authoritative sources and needs to be taken seriously.
The criticism that VECAP neglected emissions beyond the
manufacturing process drew the response (from a chemical
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‘stewardship’, generally, and that the current restriction to
manufacturing was a temporary matter of trying to ‘walk
before you run’. The sense was that exercising stewardship
across the whole lifecycle, all at once, was an unrealistic
ambition. The criticism of VECAP’s limited scope has a strong
justification: VECAP’s basic methods really only suit the
manufacturing process and would require a quite different
logic to work in the context of product use and disposal. And
there is a literature suggesting the main exposure of humans
to Deca can come from indoor dust derived from Deca-treated
products, not from emissions arising from manufacturing
processes (Betts, 2008; Lorber, 2008). Yet it sounds reasonable
to argue that a programme of any kind takes time to fully
develop. And the programme has been extended to the
handling and disposal of packaging and emissions associated
with fugitive chemical losses from warehouse storage facil-
ities (according to a VECAP annual report). This is a small
extension but can be pointed to as a recognition of the
limitations of concentrating on manufacturing emissions. As
for the criticisms, from another advocacy group, that VECAP
was ‘only’ a response to the threat of regulation, and deserves
no praise for doing what always should have been done, the
obvious defence is that this does not reflect on the effective-
ness of VECAP (whether this is significant or not) in reducing
emissions. The critics’ concernmight be that what they see as
VECAP’s limited accomplishments could be interpreted more
widely as having addressed all outstanding concerns relating
to Deca—and that this might reduce the political incentive to
address issues outstanding from the risk assessment, and
perhaps ban Deca. But the obvious response is that VECAP’s
limited ambitions are in some way proportionate to an
inconclusive risk assessment, and that it does not logically
preclude further action as further evidence emerges.
These responses do not rebut the criticisms in some
definitive way, but they look plausible to an uncommitted
audience. What we can see in VECAP, therefore, is an action
that attracts criticism because it sustains the idea of an
industry continuing to use a suspected substance—yet it
provides a basis for responding to the criticism in a way that
does not fit a caricature of a malign industry. It is criticisable,
so engages those actors who are opposed to Deca, but the
criticisms of VECAP appear to be answerable. Generally, a
programme such as VECAP appears to provide a ‘lightning
conductor’: a way for an industry, or network of organizations,
to take a defensible line on a risk issue. If critics can be
persuaded to direct their attacks at VECAP the industry has a
more convincing story to tell the world than it would if the
attacks were directed solely at the main activity of producing
and using Deca.
4.4. Independence and institutionalisation
VECAP has been institutionalised and given an independent
status in several ways. One is that it has explicit aims and
processes, together with various paraphernalia like codes of
practice. Another is that there is a formal appointment of an
auditor within the programme, whose ‘independence’ is
regularly stressed by those talking about VECAP. There are
said to be plans for VECAP ‘certification’. And VECAP isexplicitly linked with international standards: ‘VECAP is
based on recognised environmental management pro-
grammes such as 14001 and EMAS but stripped down to
basics so that it really focuses on the target chemical and can
be implemented by Small and Medium enterprises’. In the
interviews there was more ambivalence about the associa-
tion with ISO 14001, one interviewee (a textile coaters’
representative) making the point that VECAP was about
demonstrably reducing emissions, not merely operating a
management system. But the association helps to institutio-
nalise VECAP.
All this seemed necessary for several reasons. The first is
that, as indicated earlier, the firmswith the greatest emissions
were those (according to a formulator) that did not have the
resources to ‘think it out for themselves’. An explicit,
systematic, codified approach was needed to support them,
and be seen to support them. The second reason for
institutionalisation was credibility, in the eyes of regulators
particularly but also other players such as retailers who
stressed the environmental credentials of their product lines.
One retailer said that if VECAP had not existed it would have
been more likely to move towards substituting Deca. Institu-
tionalisation seemed necessary to assure actors that the
programme would continue as long as it was needed, with
sufficient resources, imposing sufficient obligations on its
members.
Third, the programme was also the source of the data that
demonstrated it worked. Its constitution and processes
needed to be institutionalised enough that people believed
the data it produced. One interviewee (a regulator) talked
about how the UK Textile Finishers’ Association became a
credible ‘expert’ source of information in dealings with the
Government because VECAPmeant it could somehowvalidate
the figures it was giving. Data from the ‘mass balance’
exercises went to the UK Department for Environment, Food
and Rural affairs. Although they were not put into the public
domain directly, they were used for the EU Risk Assessment
biennial updates. Some of the programme’s critics saw this as
problematic, one (an advocacy group representative) saying
‘we’re entirely reliant on what they’re telling us and that’s
never a comfortable position to be in’. But themore formalized
and institutionalised the process the easier it was to deal with
such criticism.
Fourth, in particular regard to the activity of advocacy
groups, the programme needed to have a sufficient weight in
thewider debate that was going on about synthetic chemicals,
the natural environment and human health. Given that
commercial corporations are constituted to pursue private,
or at least limited, interests, it is natural that people will want
to see benevolent behaviour institutionalised to believe that it
amounts to anything. Institutionalisation helps avoid the
notion that, as a creation of a particular industry, the
programme is also their creature. A particular issue in the
Deca case is the association of the chemical producer’s
umbrella group (the ‘Bromine Science and Environmental
Forum’, BSEF)with the public relations firmBurson-Marsteller,
and the attendant criticism from, for example, Corporate
Europe Observatory (CEO, 2005). Whether the institutionalisa-
tion of VECAP helps the programme escape the scepticism
accorded to BSEF is unclear.
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was not a temporary one of trying to win a debate and being
able to move on. One interviewee (a chemical producers’
representative) argued that ‘environmental groups may
change tack but will never lose interest—it’s imprinted in
their mind that bromine compounds are a bad thing’. The
expectationwas that the industry’s use of this compound, and
related ones would always be contested, and that what was
needed was not a transitory project but an established,
indefinite programme. Moreover, Deca was seen (by a former
chemical producers’ representative) as being a ‘line in the
sand’. He argued that production volumes of Deca were small
compared with other chemicals that could, if the industry
abandoned Deca, become the focus of hostile debate.
4.5. Takeover, labelling and branding
The VECAP programme, as well as becoming institutionalised,
appears to have been taken over from the formulators and
textile coaters by the chemical manufacturers, extended by
them into newdomains, and given a distinctive ‘branding’.We
referred earlier to the path of VECAP’s expansion. It appeared
to originate in discussions among textile finishers and
formulators, ‘coming to light’ before the risk assessment
was finished when Deca was under threat of a ban in 2003
(according to a textile coaters’ representative). A particular
individual in one of the formulating firms had mooted the
notion of a voluntary scheme in a risk assessment meeting.
But the programme came to be ‘formalized’ and perhaps
dominated by the chemical producers. One interviewee talked
about the programme being ‘taken over by the bromine
industry who did not seem to fully understand its particular
roots in the textile industry’. Since they supplied to the plastics
industry in parallel with the textiles industry these chemical
manufacturers also expanded the scope of the programme to
cover plastics as well. Presentations by chemical industry
representatives say that it was the three manufacturers of
Deca supplying to Europe (two American and one Israeli) who
‘cooperated to develop the VECAP programme’.
Some of the promotion of VECAP looks inflated. We
described earlier how it has been described as a programme
of ‘product stewardship’, and one casewas described to us of a
chemical manufacturer declining to supply a specific custo-
mer because it refused to subscribe to VECAP. But the chemical
manufacturers have not generally withdrawn sales to firms
refusing to join VECAP. And VECAP’s restriction to emissions
in the manufacturing process, however transient, contradicts
the general notion of stewardship. The findings of highly
elevated levels of Deca in dismantling workers (Bi et al., 2007),
and the concern of some manufacturers about the exposures
of product users to Deca, indicate that this is a significant
concern. Nonetheless, the takeover and extension of VECAP,
and its branding, all seem basic to the purpose of influencing
the world. Simply controlling emissions is unlikely to gain
much attention in a risk issue that is so contested, particularly
when the risk assessment process has failed to resolve the
disparity of opinion. So there is a sense in which the industry
will naturally want to influence people’s view of their
credentials as risk managers in ways which magnify the
impact of the physical accomplishments that have come fromVECAP. Larger corporations such as the chemical manufac-
turers tend to have more representation in bureaucratic
processes than smaller firms, so a ‘takeover’ by them may be
necessary for a programme such as this to achieve sufficient
voice in regulatory thinking and regulatory dialogue. It may be
construed that the larger corporations at both ends of the
supply chain – large chemical producers and large retailers –
are in someway exploiting VECAP, but it is necessary to co-opt
powerful players.
The branding of the programme, and its association with
ideas of ‘stewardship’, also seem necessary in overcoming the
hurdles to the acceptance of a voluntary programme. As work
on trust in relation to risk indicates (Lang and Hallman, 2005),
people have particularly low levels of trust in industry. There
is of course a danger that an over-concentration on mere
publicity will be counter-productive, but at the same time it
seems necessary to find a way of encapsulating the mentality
behind VECAP in a communicable form. Members of the
programme presented themselves as taking a new approach
to dealing with public concern; claiming VECAP as a good
example of how a sector ‘looked at the future and decided it
had got to change’. Interviewees in the industry talked several
times about having a general idea of being concerned with
emissions beyond their own organizational boundaries, of
reducing emissions whether or not the evidence of harm was
contentious, and of being ‘pro-active’ in finding and control-
ling hitherto unknown sources of emissions. But this change
of mentality is hard to make visible in an arena that is heavily
politicised and contested. And, because controlling emissions
in an industry like this is a matter of taking local actions in
many places, it is hard to generate the impression of industry
acting collectively with a common goal in mind. Having a
labelled, branded programme helps to make the idea of an
industry that hasmade a qualitative change in its thinking and
behaviour a clearer notion to the world at large. It is a vehicle
for self-portrayal as a group of proactive, precautionary and
responsible actors.
5. Discussion
The Deca case is particularly interesting because the con-
taminant in question is itself a risk controlling measure, and
much of the discourse reflects the ‘balancing’ of the toxicity
risk from using the compounds with the fire risk from not
using them. Yet there is a strong divergence in the under-
standings of different actors—notably industry and advocacy
groups but also among governments. From their individual
standpoints, the responses of other actors look like social risk
amplification: responses that are somehow amplified (posi-
tively or negatively) and therefore disproportionate to the risk
signals or evidence that produce them. From the industry’s
standpoint, in particular, there appears to be a level of
controversy that belies a risk assessment that could find little
positive evidence of significant risk. Moreover, as models of
social risk amplification emphasise, this controversy has
secondary outcomes beyond the merely physical risks in
question: for example the possibility of bans on chemical
production. The actions taken by industry look like a way of
interrupting the generation of these secondary outcomes.
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this ‘interruption’ also fits with our ideas about the social
amplification of risk:
 Institutionalisation was about counter-acting amplification
stages, convincing actors who could produce the next stage
of response – particularly regulation – not to produce this
response. It was a way of overcoming the problem that any
effort at risk management that is not organized, collective
and systematic is an effort that is suspected of being
ineffectual and half-hearted.We depend on institutions and
organizations, not haphazard activities by transient bodies,
tomanage risk—as can be seen in the particularly strong risk
amplification that seems to accompany organizational
‘recreancy’ (Freudenberg, 2003).
 Criticisability was about acting in a way that could be
criticised, by actors bothwithin and outside the programme,
yet provide a defensible and reasonably robust basis that
was not completely undermined by this criticism. The
metaphor of a ‘lightning conductor’ was suggested, to add to
SARF’s own metaphor of an amplificatory communications
system. Lightning conductors, in some loose way, should
reduce amplification effects. So, while VECAP can be
criticised for failing to deal with the exposures of product
users toDeca, it can be defended for dealing directlywith the
emissions from themanufacturing process that are thought
to explain the detection of Deca in various environmental
compartments.
 Side-benefits were said to be a way of convincing members
of a collective effort to subscribe to collective action and to
avoid free-riding. It was a whole network of organizations
that were jointly involved in making and using Deca, and
most, if not all, needed to participate in the effort if it was to
be convincing as an effective attempt to manage a risk.
Society at large has a sense that some risk issues belong to
collections of organizations, not merely organizations as
individual entities, so the failure to act collectively would be
seen as flawed and lacking in seriousness.
 The takeover and branding of the programme was again
about producing a signal that would counteract the
otherwise amplificatory influence of hostile publicity.
VECAP seemed to need a base in a substantial industrial
grouping, involving relatively large firms, and it needed a
coherent way of communicating what were otherwise a set
of simple, minor and rather pedestrian activities—like
improving the housekeeping task in small textiles coating
firms.
In controversies like that surrounding Deca, the industry
finds itself in a contradiction. It denies that its activity in
producing and using Deca is dangerous, it broadly needs to
carry on denying this in order to avoid the charge of
irresponsibility or ‘recreancy’, and anyway the Europe risk
assessment could be portrayed as supporting this. At the
same time it has concluded it must act to reduce the
emissions that it denies are dangerous, and thus appears to
take the possibility of danger seriously. But having a concept
of risk amplification, or something similar, helps avoid this
contradiction, because it is then possible to believe that a risk
is minor, yet also to believe that other actors can come tobelieve the same risk is major, and make demands that need
to be acknowledged to avoid punitive outcomes. The
particular framework of social risk amplification is not the
only one that captures this idea, and alternatives like Kuran
and Sunstein’s (1999) model of availability cascades also look
applicable. Actors like the NGOs, and the industry group
responsible for the VECAP programme, look distinctly like
Kuran and Sunstein’s ‘availability entrepreneurs’ for
instance. But SARF, because it is too loose to be a predictive
theory, also accommodates the idea that actors within a
process of amplification canhave some sense of being in such
a process, and act in away that reflects this and seeks to avoid
the outcomes that they envisage. And, while we can criticise
SARF on the basis that it is seems to imply that there is some
externally given, or true, level of risk that subsequently
becomes amplified, this does in fact capture something of the
mentality of the actors in cases like this. The industrialists
and their critics do talk as though there is a real risk that
becomes amplified or attenuated in the course of society’s
dealings with it.
Whether it is desirable that such amplification processes
should be interrupted – by building programmes like VECAP
– is as much a matter of debate as the underlying risk issue.
The advantage of having a notion of social risk amplification
as an objective statement about the world is that we can
readily say the social response to risk information has
become disproportionate, and is probably undesirable, so
any process that interrupts the amplification process is
broadly beneficial. But once social risk amplification
becomes a way of describing one group’s views of other
groups there is no reason to make this inference. In this
instance, while industry representatives could read the
European risk assessment as being favourable because it
identified no ‘risks’, others – including a representative of
the regulatory body that participated in the risk assessment
– argued that ‘serious concerns remain about Deca-BDE’s
long-term environmental (and health) impacts’. So exactly
what risk ‘signal’ is being amplified in a social amplification
process is not agreed upon. This notion that social
amplification is in the eye of the beholder, rather than an
objective phenomenon, then means that the benefits of
managing risk amplification become as much a matter of
perspective as amplification itself. The amplification of a
given risk signal could be seen as being beneficial in a
situation where initial risk information is biased in such a
way as to underplay risks, for example in the case of a
substance whose effects tend to be overlooked under
conventional testing protocols, or whose harmfulness only
becomes evident over extended periods. Amplification could
also be seen as a way of re-introducing legitimate social
concerns like equity and voluntariness when these become
lost in technical risk assessments. Moreover, the relevant
groups participating in and observing social risk amplifica-
tion change over time. In cases like that of chemical flame
retardants, restriction of one compound is likely to lead to
bigger markets for alternative compounds, and one chemical
producer’s loss might be another’s gain (or even their own
gain). Thus it is highly dependent on context exactly who
sees risk as being amplified and who stands to gain from
interrupting the risk amplification process.
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There has been a long-standing dispute over the risks
associated with PBDEs, their appearance in various envir-
onmental compartments and the toxicity risks associated
with human exposure to them. In this article we reported a
study of how an industry had developed a collective
programme to control emissions of one particular com-
pound—a compound whose risks seem to be beyond the
capacity of the existing regulatory and scientific establish-
ment to pin down, and which continues to be surrounded in
controversy. This programme was linked to the notion of
interrupting a process of social risk amplification. The risk
amplification model has been criticised for its lack of
predictive credentials, but it does appear to express the
mentality of the actors in the case of Deca. We can see the
interpretations and actions of industrial actors, in particu-
lar, as being based on the idea of a minor risk of toxicity that
has somehow become amplified through social discourse
into a major threat, likely to lead to the secondary effect of
regulation. But it became possible, in their eyes, to interrupt
the amplification process and avert regulation by enacting a
programme of voluntary emission controls. This pro-
gramme, to be credible in the view of both insiders and
outsiders, had to be institutionalised, it had to confer side-
benefits on its participants, it had to be strongly branded
and it had to be capable of being criticised. The programme
has been associated with considerable reductions in emis-
sions of the flame retardant compound at which it was
aimed, although the extent to which it caused these
reductions is disputed among the actors, and the pro-
gramme does not address the considerably greater end-of-
life emissions of Deca.
The findings from the study are naturally limited by its
small scale and qualitative methodology. But what we learn
from it is that actors – particularly industrial actors –
sometimes have to simultaneously uphold the view that a
contaminant is not significantly hazardous and act as though
it were hazardous: the way they then go about acting fits the
idea that they think in terms that closely resemble the social
amplification of risk framework.
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